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Abstract: The disputes between externalism and internalism in the philosophy of mind and 
epistemology are revealed to be greatly intertwined. In this paper, I would like to defend the 
compatibility between content externalism and epistemic internalism, and then explore some of its 
potential consequences. More precisely, I have a twofold goal: first, I shall examine the widespread 
idea that content externalism is not compatible with epistemic internalism, and argue that, if the two 
theses are appropriately understood, then there is no real tension between them; second, I shall 
sketch some interesting effects that may hopefully come from the combination of content 
externalism and epistemic internalism, as that of accommodating the constitutive link between 
justification and truth. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last few decades the disputes between externalism and internalism in the 
philosophy of mind and epistemology have revealed them to be greatly 
intertwined. In fact, it has been variously shown that considerations about the 
nature of mental content, justification and knowledge may be interdependent 
(Brown 2004; Goldberg 2007b, a; Ludlow and Martin 1998; Nuccetelli 2003). 
In what follows, I would like to defend the compatibility of content externalism 
and epistemic internalism, and then explore some of the possible consequences. 
More precisely, this paper has a twofold goal. First, I shall examine the 
widespread idea that content externalism is not compatible with epistemic 
internalism, and argue that, if the two theses are appropriately understood, then 
there is no real tension between them. I shall claim that if one can conceive 
content externalism as a diachronic holistic kind of externalism, then it happens 
to be compatible with epistemic internalism, no matter how one decides to 
typify the latter, that is, as mentalism (justification is completely determined by 
one’s own mental states), accessibilism (justification is completely determined 
by elements to which one has special cognitive access), or “strong” 
accessibilism (in order to be justified, one must have special cognitive access to 
their own justificatory status). In fact, characterising content externalism as a 
diachronic holistic kind of externalism, one should not be worried about its 
Esercizi Filosofici 11, 2016 
64 
alleged incompatibility with either privileged access or introspective access to 
sameness and difference of content (or introspective knowledge of comparative 
concepts). Second, I shall sketch some interesting consequences that might 
hopefully come from the combination of content externalism and epistemic 
internalism. In this respect, I wish to argue that, by combining content 
externalism and epistemic internalism, one may discover a promising way to 
accommodate the constitutive link between justification and truth. However, I 
shall also point out that while this conclusion could possibly work for mentalism 
and accessibilism, it would be more problematic and less convincing as far as 
“strong” accessibilism is concerned. 
 
 
2. Framing the issue 
To begin with, I feel it is reasonable to embrace both content externalism and 
epistemic internalism. On the one hand, content externalism seems better 
equipped to explain, in naturalistic terms, how our mind comes to represent the 
external world, and how thought and language are acquired. On the other hand, 
epistemic internalism seems to succeed in accommodating our intuitions about 
the following: the kind of knowledge we wish to attribute to a cognitive mature 
human being; the relationship between knowledge, reason and rationality; the 
importance of the knower’s perspective, and the deontological character of 
epistemic justification. Before arguing for the compatibility of content 
externalism and epistemic internalism, it is crucial to clarify the theses involved 
in the debate.  
Broadly speaking, content externalism claims that the content of (some) 
beliefs constitutively depends, at least in part, on objects and events in the 
outside world (content internalism being the thesis that the content of all beliefs 
completely depends on features “internal” to the subject). Of course, this is just 
a general definition, as many important differences should be made between: (i) 
physical (causal, perceptual) vs. social (linguistic); (ii) diachronic vs. 
synchronic; (iii) non-holistic vs. holistic; (iv) weak vs. strong, and (v) type vs. 
token externalism (LePore and Ludwig 2005; Amoretti 2011a). For the purpose 
of this paper, however, the relevant distinctions to consider are (i), (ii) and (iii), 
as follows. 
First, physical (causal, perceptual) externalism claims that what determines 
the content of (some of) our beliefs is the external object or event that has 
actually caused it, while social (linguistic) externalism emphasises social 
practices, arguing that the content of (some of) our beliefs is determined by 
linguistic norms and conventions. Second, diachronic externalism holds that 
facts about our history of past causal interactions with our environment are of 
central importance to what content we actually have (at least to some of them). 
Some scholars claim that a specific past period, basically the learning period, 
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may be of special importance for the fixation of content, while others think that 
content is more or less continuously sensitive to causal interactions with the 
subject’s environment for a long period stretching from the present into the past. 
Synchronic externalism argues that the content of (some of) our beliefs depends 
solely on our current environment and our dispositions to respond to it, so that 
content is not regarded as a historical fact about us, but rather as a fact about our 
potentialities in relation to our present surroundings. Third, non-holistic 
externalism maintains that the content of (some of) our beliefs depends solely 
on external objects and events in an atomic way, while holistic externalism 
holds that, even though the content of (some of) our beliefs depends on external 
factors, this dependence may not be its only component. Social factors and 
inferential relations among beliefs may be also fundamental in determining the 
content of a particular belief. This two-fold dependency implies that a difference 
in external factors must lead to a change of content, while the sameness of 
external factors does not automatically lead to the identity of content.  
In what follows I will try to show that diachronic holistic content 
externalism (DHCE) has all the resources to be compatible with epistemic 
internalism.  
 
(DHCE) Diachronic Holistic Content Externalism: the content of (some) 
beliefs constitutively depends on the causal history that has tied up the 
subject with a certain external object or event in connection with various 
other beliefs.  
 
In other words, DHCE holds that mental content constitutively depends on the 
set of those specific circumstances in which the subject has learned and 
effectively used the beliefs at issue, circumstances which include external 
objects and events, social interactions, and relations with various other beliefs.  
Moving to epistemology and epistemic internalism, a preliminary distinction 
between internalism about knowledge and justification should be made. The 
former simply claims that knowledge requires justification, while the latter 
holds that justification should be understood “internally” (externalism about 
knowledge being the thesis that knowledge does not require justification, and 
externalism about justification that justification should be understood 
“externally”). Here I shall refer to internalism about justification only, so 
epistemic internalism would be the thesis that justification is completely 
determined by “internal” conditions.  
Another important difference concerns the kind of justification one wishes to 
consider. On the one hand, propositional justification is the justification for 
believing that p (which is like having a good reason for believing that p). On the 
other hand, doxastic justification means being justified in believing that p (or 
having a justified belief, or basing one’s belief on reasons). As doxastic 
justification may clearly depend on facts external to the subject (as in the causal 
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relations between beliefs and reasons), many scholars have pointed out that 
epistemic internalism should merely focus on propositional justification (Greco 
2005; Fumerton 2007). I stick with that conclusion, so I shall refer to 
propositional justification only.  
Given the above distinctions, epistemic internalism is the claim that the 
justification for a belief that p is completely determined by some features that 
are “internal” to the subject’s mind. To put it another way, whether a subject is 
justified in believing that p supervenes on some elements internal to the 
subject’s mind. This thesis, however, can be refined at least into three different 
claims, which have been dubbed mentalism (M), accessibilism (A), and 
“strong” accessibilism (SA).  
 
(M) Mentalism: justification is completely determined by one’s own mental 
states.  
 
M is a rather weak claim, as it simply holds that one’s own mental states 
(beliefs, propositional attitudes, perceptual states, and so on) completely 
determine the justificatory status of one’s particular belief that p (Conee and 
Feldman 2001). This means that even non-reflectively accessible mental states – 
as far as they are considered mental – can determine the justificatory status of 
one’s particular belief. 
 
(A) Accessibilism: justification is completely determined by one’s own 
reflectively accessible states (that is by some elements to which the subject 
has special cognitive access). 
 
To put it differently, A argues that reflectively accessible states completely 
determine the justificatory status of one’s particular belief that p. Talking about 
“accessibility” and “special access”, scholars typically refer to what is available 
from introspection or reflection alone, or a priori, without inference from 
observation of one’s behaviour, speech or environment (Audi 2010). Given this 
definition of A, the reason why focusing on propositional justification instead of 
doxastic justification becomes clear: while the causal origin of a belief could be 
inaccessible from introspection or reflection alone, the justificatory relationships 
between beliefs (such as whether or not p contradicts q) are instead accessible. 
 
(SA) “Strong” Accessibilism: one’s own justificatory status must be 
reflectively accessible as well.  
 
This latter thesis is the strongest claiming that, in order to have a justification for 
believing that p, the subject must have special access to her own justificatory 
status. This implies that, if the subject is unable to reflectively determine 
whether or not her belief that p is justified, then she is not justified in believing 
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that p. Again, the notion of special access refers to what is accessible by 
introspection or reflection alone, but it is important to note that the notion of 
special access should not be considered as referring to either direct or infallible 
knowledge, as coming to know one’s own justificatory status certainly requires 
some reasoning. Even if it is quite demanding, SA probably best exemplifies our 
deep intuitions about epistemic internalism.  
In the next section, I shall argue that, if we characterise content externalism 
as DHCE, then it would be compatible with epistemic internalism, no matter 
how the latter is typified, that is, as M, A, or SA.  
 
 
3. Some anti-compatibilist arguments 
Starting with M, it is easy to see that anti-compatibilism cannot get off the 
ground. If the basic tenet of epistemic internalism is that justification is 
completely determined by one’s own mental states, then it is clearly compatible 
with DHCE (and, more generally, with content externalism), as beliefs are 
definitely mental states, however their content would actually be determined. As 
Earl Conee points out, if epistemic internalism “is the thesis that for epistemic 
purposes the ‘internal’ is the mental”, then “since content externalism expands 
the factors that fix the mental, content externalism expands the supervenience 
base for justification according to mentalism” (Conee 2007: 51). We can 
therefore easily state that DHCE is compatible with M. 
The alleged incompatibility between content externalism and A, and/or SA, 
depends on the widespread opinion that content externalism undermines the 
thesis of Privileged Access (PA), that is, the subject’s ability to access the 
content of her own beliefs by introspection or reflection alone, or a priori, 
without inference from observation of her own behaviour, speech or 
environment. To put it generally, content externalism claims that (some) mental 
contents are determined, at least in part, by external factors, but those factors, 
being external, may be inaccessible to the subject from introspection or 
reflection alone; (some of) the subject’s mental contents, then, may as well be 
inaccessible from introspection or reflection alone. If the subject may be unable 
to access the content of (some of) her own beliefs by introspection or reflection 
alone, then PA is denied. As a consequence, the subject may also ignore the 
content of some of her own beliefs, and thus be mistaken about what she 
actually believes. 
The point is that the lack of PA undercuts both A and SA. The two 
arguments for incompatibilism run as follows. Against A: given content 
externalism, the subject may lack the ability to access the content of (some of) 
her own beliefs by introspection or reflection alone; thus, the subject may lack 
the ability to access by introspection or reflection alone (some of) the factors 
determining the justificatory status of (some of) her beliefs. Hence, some 
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introspectively or reflectively inaccessible states do contribute to determining 
the justificatory status of (some of) her beliefs. As justification is not completely 
determined by the subject’s own accessible states, then A is false. Against SA: 
given content externalism, the subject may lack the ability to access by 
introspection or reflection alone the content of (some of) her own beliefs; thus, 
the subject may lack the ability to access by introspection or reflection alone her 
own justificatory status. As the subject’s own justificatory status may be 
introspectively or reflectively inaccessible, then SA is false.  
Generally speaking, it is not immediately clear whether content externalism 
undermines PA. Externalists generally claim that to rebut this objection it would 
be sufficient to note that what determines the content of our first-order beliefs (I 
believe that p), whatever it is, is also what determines the content of our 
corresponding second order beliefs (I believe to believe that p), leaving no room 
for error (Burge 1988, 1996; Heil 1988; Davidson 1987; Sainsbury and Tye 
2012). Then, although the subject may obviously have false beliefs, she would 
still retain PA to the content of her own beliefs. 
Two arguments have been introduced to resist this compatibilist solution. 
First, let us consider the likelihood of slow switching, of which the subject is not 
aware, between Earth and Twin Earth (Boghossian 1989; Goldberg 1997, 1999; 
Ludlow 1995, 1997). In this case, the possibility that a sample of transparent 
and odourless liquid is twin-water, instead of water, becomes a relevant 
alternative in order to evaluate whether a subject has PA to her own water-
beliefs. Given the likelihood of slow switching and the fact that they are 
unnoticed by the subject, she would not be able to establish by introspection or 
reflection alone whether she has water-beliefs or twin-water-beliefs. This means 
that the subject would not able to determine by introspection or reflection alone 
what her own current beliefs are. The argument runs as follows: 
 
(P1) Before the switch, on Earth, the subject has water-beliefs; 
(P2) After the switch, on Twin-Earth, the subject has twin-water-beliefs; 
(P3) The subject is unaware of the switch and cannot distinguish Earth from 
Twin-Earth by introspection or reflection alone; 
(P4) The subject does not know (or is unable to determine) by introspection 
or reflection alone whether she has water-beliefs or twin-water-beliefs; 
(C) Thus, the subject cannot reflectively access the content of her own 
beliefs. 
 
Such a conclusion obviously implies that the subject would not be able to 
introspectively or reflectively access (some of) the states that determine the 
justificatory status of (some of) her own beliefs. Thus, some introspectively or 
reflectively inaccessible states would possibly determine the justificatory status 
of (some of) the subject’s beliefs, which means the denial of A. Also, the subject 
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would not be able to introspectively or reflectively access her own justificatory 
status too, which means the denial of SA. 
Against this argument some scholars have pointed out that, even if the 
subject is unable to determine by introspection or reflection alone whether she 
has water-beliefs or twin-water-beliefs, this does not undermine PA (Falvey and 
Owens 1994). Moreover, it has been noted that the current belief that p counts 
as evidence for the belief of believing that p, and this would be enough to rule 
out all possible alternatives, relevant or not (Sainsbury and Tye 2012). 
Finally, the success of the argument strongly depends on what kind of 
content externalism is defended. According to DHCE, what determines content 
is the subject’s causal history (together with holistic constraints). This means 
that, immediately after the switch, the subject would still have water-beliefs (at 
least for a certain amount of time), and the second premise would simply be 
false. Of course, as the subject stays on Twin-Earth long enough, the contents of 
her beliefs would change in relation to the new environment. The point is how 
exactly these contents would change (Brown 2004). Some scholars argue that, 
after the switch, the subject would come to have both water-beliefs and twin-
water-beliefs, and thus defend the “two-concepts view” (Burge 1998; Gibbons 
1996). Others think that, after the switch, the content would change from water 
to twin-water, and thus maintain the “replacement view” (Bernecker 1998; 
Brueckner 1997). However, as I argued elsewhere (Amoretti 2007, 2011b), 
there is a third alternative that can be dubbed “amalgam view” and better fits 
with DHCE: after the switch the content of the subject’s belief would slowly 
change, as new causal interactions with the novel environment take place, 
having a sort of “amalgam” concept referring to both water and twin-water. In 
this case, the subject would still be able to introspectively or reflectively access 
not only the states determining the justificatory status of her own beliefs, but 
also their own justificatory status, which means that DHCE would still be 
compatible with both A and SA. 
Another anti-compatibilist argument is based on a reductio (McKinsey 
1991). Let us assume that the subject knows (or is able to determine) by 
introspection or reflection alone the following premises: 
 
(P1) She believes that water is wet [given PA]; 
(P2) If she believes that water is wet, then some external fact holds [given 
content externalism]; 
(C) Hence, some external fact holds. 
 
This would mean that the subject knows (or is able to determine) by 
introspection or reflection alone that some external fact holds, such as that water 
exists; but this conclusion would be absurd. As a consequence, holding content 
externalism would lead to abandon PA, and then to admit the incompatibility 
with both A and SA. 
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This argument can be resisted in various ways. First, many content 
externalists would simply deny that (P2) can be known by introspection or 
reflection alone. Moreover, even admitting that (P2) can be known by 
introspection or reflection alone, the reductio can be resisted, as additional 
premises would be needed. According to Colin McGinn (1989), it would be 
necessary to add a premise stating that the subject also believes that the belief 
that water is wet contains an atomic, natural kind concept, but this can hardly be 
known a priori. Tyler Burge (1979) similarly argues that it would be necessary 
to add a premise asserting that the subject also believes that the belief that water 
is wet contains a deferential concept referring to a certain linguistic community; 
again, this cannot be known a priori. Finally, Donald Davidson (1990, 1991, 
1995, 1997) would probably maintain the necessity of adding a premise 
claiming that the subject also believes that the belief that water is wet contains a 
perceptual concept that “anchors” mind and language to the world, and this 
claim too can hardly be known a priori (see Amoretti 2008; 2011). So, to 
conclude the discussion on the compatibility of PA with content externalism, we 
can state that DHCE is compatible with both A and SA. 
Another anti-compatibilist strategy is to argue merely against the 
compatibility between content externalism and SA. This move is based on the 
conviction that content externalism undermines the thesis of Introspective 
Knowledge of Comparative Concepts (IKCC) – the basic issue clearly being 
that the lack of IKCC would undermine SA. IKCC can be seen as the 
conjunction of two theses: 
 
i) Transparency of sameness of content (TSC): for any couple of a subject’s 
beliefs that p and that q entertained at a certain time t, if the beliefs that p 
and that q have the same content, then at t the subject knows by 
introspection or reflection alone that they have the same content. 
ii) Transparency of difference of content (TDC): for any couple of a 
subject’s beliefs that p and that q entertained at a certain time t, if the beliefs 
that p and that q have a different content, then at t the subject knows by 
introspection or reflection alone that they have a different content. 
 
Given content externalism, a subject with two occurring beliefs, that p and that 
q, may not be able to establish by introspection or reflection alone whether the 
beliefs that p and that q have the same (or a different) content. If this is the case, 
then the subject cannot introspectively or reflectively grasp all the logical 
relations between these beliefs. As logical relations affect the justificatory status 
of one’s beliefs, the subject would not introspectively or reflectively know 
whether (some of) her beliefs are justified, and thus she would lack a priori 
access to the justificatory status of (some of) her beliefs. Accordingly, SA 
would be false (even if the subject might not be able to establish by 
introspection or reflection alone whether p and q have the same or a different 
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content, this does not affect A, as long as one admits that the subject has access 
to her own contents by introspection or reflection alone). 
Two arguments have been developed to support the anti-compatibilist 
conclusion. First, let us suppose that, even if cilantro and coriander are clearly 
the same herb, the subject does not know that. The argument would run as 
follows: 
 
(P1) The subject believes that cilantro is used in Mexican dishes 
[hypothesis]; 
(P2) The subject believes that coriander is used in Mexican dishes 
[hypothesis]; 
(P3) The two beliefs have the same content [given content externalism]; 
(P4) As the subject ignores that cilantro and coriander are the same herb, she 
cannot establish by introspection or reflection alone that the two beliefs have 
the same content [as the subject needs to make an empirical investigation to 
discover the identity between cilantro and coriander]; 
(C) Thus, the subject cannot introspectively or reflectively grasp all the 
logical relations between her beliefs. 
 
This conclusion would imply that the subject may lack introspective or 
reflective access to the justificatory status of (some of) her beliefs. Accordingly, 
SA would be false. There are various ways to resist this reasoning, but 
endorsing DHCE allows one to reject (P3), that is the idea that the belief that 
cilantro is used in Mexican dishes and the belief that coriander is used in 
Mexican dishes have the very same content. According to DHCE, what gives 
content to our beliefs is not the external cause by itself, but rather the specific 
causal history that has tied up the subject with a certain external object in 
connection with many other beliefs. To put it differently, the content is 
determined by the set of those specific circumstances, encompassing both causal 
chains and holistic relationships, in which the subject has acquired the concepts 
and effectively learned the beliefs at issue. As I argued elsewhere, if this 
externalist position holds, then there would be two different beliefs and thus no 
sameness of content where the anti-compatibilists see it (Amoretti 2007).  
The second argument, which is based on the likelihood of slow switches and 
the fact that they are unnoticed by the subject, runs as follows: 
 
(P1) At t, the subject believes that, as a child, she lived near a river full of 
spring water [she were on Earth and thus, given externalism, her belief refers 
to water]; 
(P2) At t, the subject believes that now she lives near a river full of spring 
water [she is now on Twin-Earth and thus, given externalism, her belief 
refers to twin-water]; 
(P3) The two beliefs have a different content [given externalism]; 
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(P4) As the subject is unaware of the switch and cannot distinguish Earth 
from Twin-Earth, she cannot establish by introspection or reflection alone 
that the two beliefs have a different content [as the subject needs to make an 
empirical investigation to distinguish Earth from Twin-Earth]; 
(C) Thus, the subject cannot introspectively or reflectively grasp all the 
logical relations between her beliefs. 
 
This conclusion would obviously imply that the subject may lack introspective 
or reflective access to the justificatory status of (some of) her beliefs. 
Accordingly, SA would be false. In this respect, we have already seen that the 
plausibility of this line of argument strongly depends on how the subject’s 
contents would actually change: only the “two-concepts view” would be 
challenged by the objection. On the contrary, holding the “amalgam view”, the 
option that better fits with DHCE, the objection is immediately blocked. This 
means that DHCE is still compatible with SA. 
More generally, and more importantly, there are some strong doubts about 
the very plausibility of IKCC. If this is so, then the possibility that content 
externalism would undermine IKCC would not be a problem for compatibilism 
itself. According to some scholars, requiring IKCC would be too strong a 
request, as there are some important analogies with perception (Sainsbury and 
Tye 2012). Let us think about illusions (as the Muller-Lyer illusion): in similar 
cases, we could perceive the same (or a different) object without recognising 
that it is the same (or a different) object. Moreover, the notion of rationality that 
is implicit in IKCC seems to be too strong: as sameness and difference of 
content can be determined through empirical investigation, it does not seem 
legitimate to pretend that they must be judged by introspection or reflection 
alone. The very philosophers who criticise compatibilism agree that rationality 
does not depend on the number of true beliefs that a subject holds, but on the 
logical relations linking these beliefs. And logical relations, by definition, leave 
aside the content of the beliefs involved. For instance, a subject would be 
irrational if, believing that a  b and b  c, she fails to recognise that a  c; 
but she should be regarded as rational if she believes that a  b and c  d but, 
ignoring that b = c, fails to recognise that a  d, as the fact that b = c (or b  c) 
can only be determined through empirical investigation, not by introspection or 
reflection alone. 
For example, let us assume that a subject believes both that someone shot 
John Locke, and that nobody shot John Locke. It would be essential to 
distinguish cases where the subject is aware to hold contradictory beliefs (in this 
case she should be judged irrational) from cases where the subject ignores to 
hold contradictory beliefs, for instance, believing that someone shot John Locke 
(taking this claim to refer to the character of Lost), and that nobody shot John 
Locke (mistakenly taking this claim to refer to the philosopher). In this latter 
case the subject would believe falsely, but rationally and would be justified in 
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doing so, that someone shot John Locke and that nobody shot John Locke  
(Sainsbury and Tye 2012). When the aim is judging the subject’s own 
rationality, it does not matter if she has true or false beliefs. The subject can 
legitimately make some inferences that are coherent with her overall knowledge, 
even if they are wrong from a metaphysical perspective. These inferences, in 
fact, can be perfectly compatible with the subject’s whole set of beliefs, even 
though they lead to a basically wrong conclusion due to the fact that our 
perspective is limited and fallible. If we take as a criterion for rationality the 
transparency of mental content, we fail to consider one fundamental 
characteristic of doxastic contexts, i.e., the fact that they are opaque.  
 
 
4. Some consequences of compatibilism 
Having granted compatibilism between content externalism and epistemic 
internalism (in its various forms), it is now possible to evaluate some of its 
consequences. In this respect, I wish to argue that, by combining content 
externalism and epistemic internalism, one may discover an interesting way to 
accommodate the constitutive link between justification and truth. However, I 
shall point out that this conclusion may work for M and A, but it is more 
problematic and less convincing as far as SA is concerned. 
According to some critics, epistemic internalism would fail to accommodate 
the link between justification and truth, as it does not explain how justification 
relates to truth, or even denies the necessity of any relation between justification 
and truth; whether one’s belief is likely to be true is not determined by either 
one’s own mental states or one’s own introspectively or reflectively accessible 
states. However, granting the link between justification and truth would be 
important for epistemic internalism, as this would help to distinguish epistemic 
justification from non-epistemic justification (such as prudential, pragmatic or 
moral justification). Content externalism may help to accommodate this missing 
link by showing that beliefs are, by their own nature, veridical (Davidson 1990).  
Broadly speaking, some scholars (for a review, see Brueckner 2016) have 
variously argued that content externalism, possibly combined with PA, may 
have some important epistemological consequences, such as: 
 
i) that we are not brains in a vat; 
ii) that a coherent set of beliefs cannot be totally or even largely false; 
iii) that it is highly probable that a coherent set of beliefs is not totally or 
even largely false; 
iv) that perceptual beliefs cannot be totally or even largely false, and 
v) that it is highly probable that perceptual beliefs are not totally or even 
largely false. 
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Let us consider DHCE: the content of (some) beliefs is determined by the causal 
history that has tied up the subject with a certain external object or event in 
connection with various other beliefs. This seems to imply that a coherent set of 
beliefs cannot be totally or even largely false. To put it another way, if one has 
beliefs at all, then DHCE guarantees that a set of beliefs cannot be totally or 
largely false, in particular as far as perceptual beliefs are concerned. Probably, 
as I tried to show in previous works (Amoretti 2011b, 2008b, a), DHCE has 
weaker consequences, such as:  
 
i) that a coherent set of beliefs cannot always have been totally or even 
largely false, or  
ii) that it is highly probable that a coherent set of beliefs would not always 
have been totally or even largely false. 
 
To begin, let us apply the above consequences of DHCE to M (justification is 
completely determined by one’s own mental states) and A (justification is 
completely determined by one’s own reflectively accessible states). With some 
simplifications, we can say that in both cases justification is completely 
determined by reasons in the form of other (reflectively accessible) beliefs. Two 
classic theories of justification are typically regarded as internalist in this sense, 
that is, coherentism and foundationalism. 
According to coherentism, all justified beliefs are inferentially justified, that 
is they cohere with a significant number of other beliefs. The basic idea is that 
there is a presumption in favour of the truth of a belief that coheres with a vast 
array of other beliefs, and every belief thus counts as justified in the light of 
such a presumption. However, a set of (at least) largely true beliefs is needed to 
secure the above presumption, and coherence alone cannot guarantee that a 
coherent set of beliefs is largely true (Davidson 1983, 1990). On the contrary, 
content externalism seems to be able to do the job granting at least that a 
coherent set of beliefs cannot be (or cannot always have been) totally or even 
largely false – or that it is highly probable that a coherent set of beliefs is not 
(has not always have been) totally or even largely false. If a belief coheres with 
a vast array of beliefs, which is not totally or even largely false, then the 
presumption in favour of its truth, and thus its justification, is secured. 
A similar reasoning can be made for foundationalism, according to which all 
justified beliefs ultimately rest upon a foundation of non-inferentially justified 
beliefs, such as perceptual beliefs (or self-evident beliefs, etc.). Here the basic 
idea is that there is a presumption in favour of the truth of a belief that rest upon 
some non-inferentially justified beliefs, such as perceptual beliefs (which derive 
their justification from some non-doxastic perceptual states), and every belief 
thus counts as justified in the light of such a presumption. However, perceptual 
beliefs must be largely true to secure the above presumption, and perception 
alone cannot guarantee that. Again, content externalism seems at least to be able 
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to grant that one’s own perceptual beliefs cannot be totally or even largely false 
– or that it is highly probable that one’s own perceptual beliefs are not totally or 
even largely false. If a belief rests upon non-inferentially justified beliefs, such 
as perceptual beliefs, which are not totally or even largely false, then the 
presumption in favour of its truth, and thus its justification, is secured. 
In both cases, content externalism seems to be able to provide the link 
between justification and truth that was missing from internalist theories of 
justification, at least conceiving them as M or A. But what about SA? I feel that, 
in this case, the above results would be useless. According to SA, a subject must 
be aware by introspection or reflection alone of her justificatory status. This 
means that she must be aware, by introspection or reflection alone, not only that 
a belief that p coheres with many other coherent beliefs, but also that there are 
good reasons to assume that cohering beliefs cannot be totally or even largely 
false (alternatively, not only that a belief that p rests upon some non-
inferentially justified beliefs such perceptual beliefs, but also that there are good 
reasons to assume that perceptual beliefs cannot be totally or even largely false). 
This would be quite difficult, as it requires that the subject knows content 
externalism and its consequences, which is highly improbable. 
To conclude, at least some kinds of content externalism, such as DHCE, are 
compatible with epistemic internalism in all its forms. By combining content 
externalism and epistemic internalism, one may discover an interesting way to 
accommodate the constitutive link between justification and truth – a way that 
can hardly be provided by epistemic internalism alone. However, this result 
obtains for M and A, while it is more problematic and unconvincing as far as 
SA is concerned. 
 
 
Acknowledgements. I gratefully thank Nicla Vassallo for her helpful and 




AMORETTI, M.C.  
2007 «Triangulation and Rationality», Epistemologia 2, 307-326. 
2008a «Davidson, Self-Knowledge, and Scepticism», in  M.C. Amoretti and N. Vassallo (eds.), 
Knowledge, Language, and Interpretation: On the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Ontos 
Verlag, Frankfurt. 
2008b  Il triangolo dell’interpretazione: sull’epistemologia di Donald Davidson, FrancoAngeli, 
Milano. 
2011a La mente fuori dal corpo. Prospettive esternaliste in relazione al mentale, FrancoAngeli, 
Milano. 
2011b «Triangulation between Externalism and Internalism», in M.C. Amoretti and G. Preyer 
(eds.), Triangulation: From an Epistemological Point of View, Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt, 47-
68. Frankfurt. 




AUDI, R.  
2010 Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 3rd ed.,  
Routledge, London. 
BERNECKER, S.  
1998 «Self-Knowledge and Closure», in P. Ludlow and N. Martin (eds.), Externalism and Self-
Knowledge, CSLI Publications, Stanford, CA, 333-350. 
BOGHOSSIAN, P.  
1989 «Content and Self-Knowledge», Philosophical Topics 17, 5-26. 
BROWN, J.  
2004 Anti-individualism and Knowledge, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
BRUECKNER, A.  
1997 «Externalism and memory», Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78, 1-12. 
2016 «Skepticism and Content Externalism» (previously entitled «Brains in a Vat»), in E.N. 
Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/skepticism-content-externalism/>. 
BURGE, T.  
1979 «Individualism and the Mental», Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4, 73-122. 
1988 «Individualism and Self-Knowledge», The Journal of philosophy 85, 649-663. 
1996 «Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge», Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96, 91-116. 
1998 «Memory and Self-Knowledge», in P. Ludlow and N. Martin (eds.), Externalism and Self-
Knowledge, CSLI Publications, Stanford, CA, 351-369. 
CONEE, E.  
2007 «Externally Enhanced Internalism», in S. Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in 
Semantics and Epistemology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 51-67. 
CONEE, E. AND FELDMAN, R.  
2001 «Internalism defended», in H. Kornblith (ed.), Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism, 
Blackwell, Oxford, 231-259. 
DAVIDSON, D.  
1983 «A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge», in D. Henrich (ed.), Kant oder Hegel, 
Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 423-438. 
1987 «Knowing One’s Own Mind», Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical 
Association 60, 441-458. 
1990 «Epistemology Externalised», in D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 193-203. 
1991 «Three Varieties of Knowledge», Philosophy 66, 156-166. 
1995 «The Problem of Objectivity», Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 57, 203-220. 
1997 «The Emergence of Thought», in D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 123-134 
FALVEY, K. AND OWENS, J.  
1994 «Externalism, Self-knowledge, and Skepticism», Philosophical Review 103, 107-137. 
GIBBONS, J.  
1996 «Externalism and Knowledge of Content», Philosophical Review 105, 287-310. 
Amoretti / To what extent are content externalism and epistemic internalism compatible? 
77 
GOLDBERG, S.  
1997 «Self-Ascription, Self-Knowledge, and the Memory Argument», Analysis 57, 211-219. 
1999 «Word-Ambiguity, World-Switching, and Knowledge of Content: Reply to Brueckner», 
Analysis 59, 212-217. 
2007a Anti-Individualism. Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
2007 Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
HEIL, J.  
1988 «Privileged Access», Mind 97, 238-251. 
LEPORE, E., AND LUDWIG, K.  
2005 Donald Davidson. Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
LUDLOW, P.  
1995 «Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and the Prevalence of Slow-Switching» Analysis 55: 45-49. 
1997 «On the Relevance of Slow Switching» Analysis 57: 285-286. 
LUDLOW, P., AND MARTIN, N. (EDS.) 
1998 Externalism and Self-Knowledge, CSLI Publications, Stanford, CA. 
MCGINN, C.  
1989 Mental Content, Blackwell, New York, NY. 
NUCCETELLI, S.  
2003 New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
SAINSBURY, R.M. AND TYE, M. 
2012 Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
